3 on their self-determination goals -whereby nationalist parties are often (mistakenly) understood as independence-seeking parties that base their claims to nationhood on historical, cultural and linguistic factors whilst regionalist parties tend to be seen as having more functional demands for greater powers from the state. This article rejects this analytical separation and instead proposes to examine those parties that seek to represent and advance the interests and identity of a given substate territory, which may or may not be defined as a nation or region. Territorial interests are not only concerned with 'nationhood', identity and self-determination in the symbolic or constitutional sense, but also with socioeconomic demands such as addressing regional economic disparities and demographic matters concerning the labour market (Hepburn 2009 ).
Regionalist Parties in Europe
A number of studies have demonstrated how regionalist parties have reoriented their autonomy goals to include the European level (Lynch 1996; Keating 2001; McGarry & Keating 2006; Hepburn 2006; Elias 2008a ). Regionalist parties are now able, indeed obligated, to frame their interests and demands at levels of authority beneath and beyond the state. The assumption that these parties universally seek secession and statehood is therefore misplaced. With the clear exception of the independence-seeking Scottish National Party, most parties have long pursued less radical forms of constitutional change. In particular, regionalist parties in Europe have interpreted selfdetermination to mean different degrees of autonomy, which includes a place within a Europe of the Regions or Peoples (Keating 2001; Elias 2008b; Hepburn 2008a) . European integration offers these parties a number of opportunities for political engagement, such as networking and lobbying opportunities, and participation in transnational groups such as the European Free Alliance (De Winter and Gómez-Reino 2002) . Whereas it could be argued that autonomy goals once focused exclusively on state structures, parties now lobby at the European level to advance their territorial projects (Lynch 1996; Keating 2001 Keating , 2006 .
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Regionalist parties, associated with the phenomenon of 'stateless' nationalism, have been perceived as parochial and backward, with tendencies toward a 'closed' vision of a politically and culturally homogenous nation. For instance, Lipset (1985) believed that peripheral nationalism was a 'revolt against modernity ' whilst Hobsbawm (1990) argued that nationalist movements were throwbacks to the past, based on pre-modern and closed visions of society. Yet there has been growing recognition of the virtues of nationality and regionalism. Scholars, such as Miller (1995) , Guibernau (2002) and Keating (2006) maintain that such movements can be equally forwardlooking and progressive, seeking new forms of collective organisation amid the rescaling of political authority brought about by supranational integration. Instead of seeking to banish the 'other', parties have often exhibited self-consciously liberal and democratic forms of territorial mobilisation, for instance arguing for recognition of the diversity of 'peoples' in the EU.
It has been argued that deepening political integration has caused regionalist parties to 'internationalise' their appeals and demands (Keating 1995; Lynch 1996; Jolly 2007 ). This has occurred for both ideological and practical reasons. On one hand, parties must play the European ideological 'game' to be perceived as credible, thus emphasising themes intrinsic to the shared value framework of Europe such as democracy, diversity and human rights. On the other, parties have welcomed Europe into their projects in order to receive structural funds, to access decisionmaking at the European level and to participate in Europe-wide political lobbying associations. The next part of this discussion considers whether, as argued by Keating (2006) , European integration has led to a 'de-ethnicisation' of regionalist parties and an increased emphasis on territory as the criterion of inclusion in the territorial community. Keating's assertion forces a re-evaluation of the assumption that the regionalist 'party family' is a single homogenous group. Instead it is necessary account for variation in forms of territorial mobilisation, allowing for strategic party responses to changing political circumstances, and the possibility that parties may exhibit different cultural, economic and political markers at different times.
Party Constructions of the Territory
Regionalist parties in Scotland, Bavaria, Catalonia and Northern Italy have articulated distinct immigration strategies as part of their territorial projects. They have sought to sustain the territory as a key unit of shared identity and have constructed or re-appropriated cultural meanings of the territory -be it referred to a nation, region, people or Heimat -in line with their socioeconomic and immigration goals. The following section examines how the Scottish National Party (SNP), Catalan Convergence and Union Party (CiU), Italian Northern League (LN) and Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) 'construct' the territories that they claim to represent. The focus is on the way in which parties use cultural, economic or territorial markers of membership of the nation, and how this is linked to their main political and socioeconomic goals.
Scottish National Party
The Scottish National Party was formed in 1934, and remains to this day the leading regionalist party in Scotland. The party's main goal is independence, to be achieved within a European construct. Since 1990 the SNP has articulated a social-democratic policy platform, though the party also contains centre-right elements (Lynch 2002 (Lynch , 2009 . With devolution, the SNP became the official opposition in the Scottish Parliament in 1999, and in May 2007 it formed a minority Scottish government -the first with the explicit aim of breaking up the UK (Hepburn 2008c) .
For the SNP, the Scottish nation constitutes a political community that requires sovereign statehood in order to make it a 'normal nation' (Salmond 2008) . Scotland, it is argued, is a country rich in natural resources and a skilled population that could easily overturn its sluggish economic growth with independence (SNP 2003) . Scholars have highlighted the overtly 'civic' character of the SNP. For instance, Hamilton (1999 Hamilton ( , 2007 argued that Scottish political nationalism was a model of associative identity-politics in Europe, whilst Nairn (2000) believed that the SNP had recaptured the democratic voice of Scotland. The nation is characterised territorially, and thus anyone can consider herself to form that nation by living in it and sharing in its institutions and 6 society. This inclusiveness means that the 'tariff' for being a nationalist is quite low, and allows the SNP to appeal to the widest voting electorate. The 'nation' includes non-native born or blooddescent Scots, which is underlined by the SNP's affiliated organisations, Asian Scots for Independence and New Scots for Independence. The party has maintained that ' [t] he presence in Scotland of people from diverse origins is a source of enrichment for Scottish society' (SNP 1992: 13) . The SNP's understanding of 'national belonging' as voluntary participation in a multicultural society also deflects criticism that the party is exclusionary or anti-English (Leith 2008) . The party is mindful that any emphasis on birth or tradition will arouse accusations of narrow 'ethnic' nationalism, which would discredit the movement and undermine its appeal to broad sections of Scottish society.
Bavarian Christian Social Union
The Christian Social Union has governed Bavaria near continuously since 1946 and claims to be the party of the Bavarian people, defender of federalism and guardian of the Heimat (Mintzel 1978; Roth 1994; Waigel 1995; Jesse 1996) . The term Heimat implies a sense of belonging to the land, culture and traditions and has been made equivalent to 'nation' in some analyses (Sutherland 2001; Hepburn 2008b) . In contrast to the SNP, the CSU has continuously constructed the Bavarian nation an 'imagined community' with strong emotional and symbolic content. Its understanding of the Bavarian nation derives, firstly, from an historical myth of statehood and shared culture and traditions that sits alongside, but ultimately supersedes, the identity and traditions of Bavaria's diverse regions (Mintzel 1992; James 1995; Ford 2007) . The CSU's construction of Bavaria is also based upon the post-war modernisation of the Land, with the CSU at the helm (Kleinhenz 1995; Mintzel 1999) . This vision of 'modern' Bavaria brimming with high-tech industries is complemented by safeguarding traditional economic communities, such as craftsmen and farmers, which are associated with Bavaria's history, culture and social values. Finally, to forge a sense of common purpose and belonging, the CSU has sought to overcome divisions between Protestant and 7 Catholic communities by developing cultural policies that assert Bavaria's unique identity, such as holding traditional festivals and cultural events (Sutherland 2000) . The CSU does not, however, support the development of a 'multicultural' Bavaria. In 1989, CSU Leader Edmund Stoiber said that 'talk of a multicultural society tears up the very roots of our national and cultural identity, developed over centuries ' (cited in Roth 1995: 324) . Instead, the party seeks to preserve and protect the Bavarian Heimat from foreign cultures, especially those outside the EU.
Catalan Convergence and Union Party
The Convergence and Union Party (CiU) is a federation of conservative, liberal and Christian Democratic parties in Catalonia. It won the first Catalan regional elections in 1980, and was the regional party of government until 2003 when it was narrowly defeated by a left-wing coalition. In the aftermath of the Franco regime, Jordi Pujol's party sought to rebuild the Catalan nation around a common identity, based on a shared history, culture and language, and mobilised towards the goal of economic progress (Keating 2006) . In its struggles with the Spanish state to obtain more autonomy, it has insisted on the hecho diferencial, or specificity, of the Catalan nation. The CiU constructs the nation in line with its own ideological beliefs, emphasising tradition and the Catholic social doctrine. Yet the CiU also views the Catalan nation as adaptable to modern conditions and highly democratic. To that end, the CiU has strenuously promoted a 'civic' nation-building project (Guibernau 2006 ). Pujol's assertion that 'everyone who lives and works in Catalonia and has a wish to be so and feels tied to this land, is Catalan' has become official party, as well as government, policy (Pujol 1976; Keating 1996) . Therefore, for the CiU membership of the Catalan nation is based on territorial and linguistic markers, rather than race or descent (Conversi 1997) .
The Northern League
The Northern League (LN) was created in 1991 as a confederation of regionalist 'leagues' that evolved into a single centralised party. Described variously as a regionalist, populist, anti-migrant, 8 and/or radical right party (Biorcio 1991; Betz 1994; Gomez-Reino 2002; McDonnell 2006; Zaslove 2006) , the Lega has altered its constitutional to encompass federalism, secession and devolution.
The latter goal has been pursued as part of Berlusconi's centre-right Pole of Liberty governments. The Lega's greatest challenge has been to create an imagined community of 'Padania', loosely based on the geographical boundaries of Northern Italy, that has no historical basis (Biorcio 1997; Gomez-Reino 2002) . Faced with these difficulties, the LN has sought to invent a historical and cultural narrative for Padania, for instance referring to the glorious battles of its Celtic predecessors 
Party Responses to Changing Demographics
There are few issues that have aroused the panic of the West European electorate than the prospect of rapid demographic and consequent social change, resulting from an aging population, falling birth rates, the increased mobility of workers and growing asylum and immigration. A recent survey on public attitudes towards migration and European integration in six EU member states revealed that a significant share of citizens is apprehensive about immigration (Diamanti and Bordignon 2005) . The study found that the degree of public concern generated by immigrants is highest in Italy and Germany, whereby 35-40% of respondents believed that immigrants posed a threat to employment, public order and safety (ibid: 5-6). This research corroborates a number of studies highlighting the potentially destabilizing effects of immigration on the politics and society of host 9 states (see Messina 2002) . Immigration-related issues have risen to the top of the public policy agenda of the EU and its member states (Messina and Thouez 2002) , resulting in a widespread tightening of irregular and illegal controls (Coleman 2002: 47) . In response to such concerns, many countries have seen the emergence of grassroots anti-immigrant protests (Della Porta 1996; GomezReino 2002: 132) , and the rise of radical right anti-immigrant parties that have received over 10% of the vote in nine European states (Zaslove 2004: 99; Mudde 2007) . Such parties have linked immigration to crime, public disorder, the demise of traditional cultures, unemployment and an overburdened welfare state. Other political parties, meanwhile, have had to tread very carefully around these issues, not least due to uncertainty about how to compete with radical right parties. As a consequence, there are few parties in Europe that are not divided on immigration policy (Lahav 2004: 15) . As Zaslove (2006) argues, immigration is a cross-cleavage issue in left-right terms, posing challenges for traditional parties as well as 'new politics' movements.
Although immigration is generally reserved to the central government, it also affects a number of devolved policy areas including economic development, infrastructure, healthcare, and housing, causing some regional actors to call for greater control over immigration. Most vociferously, regionalist parties have argued that devolving immigration policy to the regions, which is currently practiced in countries such as Australia and Canada (Quebec), allows regional actors to better integrate welfare and development policies (Wright 2006) . It also, arguably, allows regions to emphasise their claims to nationhood or 'distinct society' by setting their own terms for territorial membership and immigrant integration (Delgado 1998; Zapata Barrero 2007) . The following section explores how regionalist parties have responded to the immigration debate in each of the four regions.
Scotland
Net migration in the UK has increased dramatically under the New Labour government since the late 1990s (Davis 2009 ). From 1998, net immigration to the UK surged by over 100,000 per annum (Hatton 2005) . This has been the result of a highly controlled immigration strategy, which has focused on the active recruitment of highly skilled economic migrants vis-à-vis the expansion of the work permit system and the creation of a points-based migration system (Somerville 2007) .
Increased economic migration has gone hand-in-hand with more astringent asylum requirements, achieved through the tightening of regulations in four separate bills since 1999. Government policy has been characterised as favouring business interests in immigration policy whilst ostracizing others (Davis 2009 ). The English media response to increased (economic) migration has been a mixture of fear and panic, with immigrants being perceived as a drain on the welfare state and difficult to integrate, particularly in the heavily populated South-east. Bailey (2008) argued that the media's reaction to immigrants and asylum seekers has been to define and name them as the 'Other' in a dichotomy of 'us versus them'. The situation in Scotland, however, has been quite different. In 'demand' terms, Scotland has long faced a decline in population, caused by emigration and falling birth rates. In 'supply' terms, Scotland received fewer immigrants per head than other parts of the UK (Wright 2007) . As a result of these differences, public attitudes towards immigration to Scotland, in addition to immigrants' identification with their host country, have diverged from England (Saeed et al 1999; Bond 2006) . Parties have overwhelmingly welcomed, rather than feared, immigration as a means of resolving Scotland's distinct demographic challenges.
As previously stated, the SNP has asserted a 'civic' kind of nationalism, whereby its criteria for national membership is based on territory rather than blood or descent. The SNP advocates opening up Scotland's doors to further immigration to attract vital skilled workers, and has proposed a devolved immigration policy for Scotland to achieve this goal (SNP 2007a) . The party supports this policy on economic grounds whilst at the same time advocating principles of diversity and freedom. The SNP wishes to increase immigration so that Scotland has a 'stable population' and immigrant families can contribute to high-quality public services for future generations. As SNP Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill argued, 'Our economic needs and social wants are different and distinct to the rest of the UK. As a nation of emigrants we wish to see immigrants coming to Scotland dealt with kindness and compassion, not brutality and oppression ' (Holyrood, 29 October 2006) . MacAskill was referring to the contentious treatment of asylum seekers in Scotland, an issue reserved to Westminster. With regards to economic immigration, the SNP sought to extend the Scottish Lib-Lab government's 'Fresh Talent' initiative, which arranged for overseas students to be granted a two-year visa extension (Scottish Executive 2004) . The SNP argued that Scotland required immigration to fill lower-skilled positions, and has advocated the introduction of a 'green card' and a devolved immigration policy that allowed Holyrood ministers to set a population target, based on a points system that took into consideration skills, age and education (The Sunday Herald, 20 February 2005; SNP 2007b: 22) . The SNP's main argument for attracting more people to live and work in Scotland was to boost the labour market and to encourage the development of a multicultural Scotland free from racism and intolerance (SNP 2005; Leith 2008 ).
Bavaria
Germany's citizenship and immigration laws have long been the source of contention. Until 1998, immigration was based on the principle of jus sanguinis (by blood) whereby ethnic Germans born abroad were granted citizenship, whilst residents not of German descent were considered foreigners (Grieco 2002) . This policy was created in response to expulsion of 12 million ethnic Germans to Central and Eastern Europe following the Second World War (Rock and Wolff 2002). However, a change in the law was required to account for the rise in temporary and guest workers that were employed to meet economic demand caused by falling birth rates, and later in response to EU enlargement. In 1998 a new citizenship and immigration law based on principle of jus soli (by birth) was introduced by the new SPD-Green federal government. This law was vigorously challenged by the CDU-CSU opposition, which succeeded in watering down some elements (Zaslove 2006) .
Despite this, Germany has seen a dramatic rise in asylum and immigration, and this has become a central focus of debate in federal and Land politics.
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It has been argued that 'CSU leaders and Bavarians in general tended to be particularly nationalistic and unsympathetic to foreigners and immigration' (Hoadley 2003: 5) . The CSU has advocated a drastic reduction in the number of immigrants and asylum seekers that Germany accepts. In 1998, Bavaria demanded an opt-out from EU immigration rules, in order that the CSUled government could require proof from immigrants that they had a job and health insurance in Bavaria. In the federal election that year the CSU also criticised Gerhard Schröder for pledging to work in the interest of Germans and people living in Germany; it did not believe that the government should work on behalf of 'non-citizens'. The CSU even sought to insert the phrase 'Germany is not an immigration country' into the CDU-CSU electoral manifesto, but was deflected from doing so (Hoadley 2003) . In 2000 the Bavarian government introduced a restrictive 'Blue Card' that tied the granting of a residence permit to a particular employment contract. And in 2002 the CSU launched a petition that collected 5 million signatures that opposed the immigration law put forward by the SPD-Greens federal government, which laid out a number of measures designed to encourage foreigners to integrate into German society (Green 2000) . CSU leader Edmund Stoiber argued that immigration could not be increased whilst unemployment in Germany was so high, as it placed too great a strain on public services (BBC, 22 March 2002) . The CSU has also made a cultural argument against immigration. In its construction of national identity, the CSU ascribes a religious meaning to Bavaria as a Christian state (Ford 2007: 293) . As a result, the CSU has argued against Turkish membership of the European Union, as extreme religious diversity threatens the Christian roots and societal structures of 'Europe'.
2 Within Bavaria, the CSU advocates a reduction in future immigrants, which are considered a threat to Bavaria's culture, and assimilation of those who gain entry. Sutherland (2000: 206) argues that the party's position on immigration policy indicates that 'the CSU's understanding of national loyalty is of a deep-rooted, quasi-religious feeling of belonging, rather than the mere exercise of citizenship rights'.
Catalonia © Hepburn, E. (2009) West European Politics, 32(3) , 514-535.
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Spain has amongst the lowest birth rates and highest immigration rates in the European Union. The relative weight of foreigners in Spain's total population rose from 1% (350,000) in 1991 to 10%
( Catalonia's history of immigrant absorption has had significant effects on Catalan's social structure as well as the definition of Catalan identity (Guibernau 2002) . But rather than perceiving immigrants as a threat to Catalan culture, immigration is perceived as beneficial to the economy and the nation (Pujol 1976; Delgado 1998) . In 2001, the CiU-led Catalan government drafted an immigration policy that went 'against the grain of standard migration policy and differs greatly from the Immigration Law approved by the Spanish parliament' due to its flexibility, openness, and emphasis on social rights and citizenship (Sedura i Mas 2001).
14 The CiU has forged an inclusive 'civic' Catalan identity, where language is marker of identity, but has also been used as a tool for assimilation (Conversi 1997) . Linguistic normalization, which compels immigrants to become 'culturally Catalan', is central to the CiU's project of nationbuilding in Catalonia (Keating 1996) . A number of laws have established Catalan as the language of public administration, the media and education (Castiñeira 2007 ). Yet instead of alienating newcomers, this policy is supported by immigrants and Southern Spanish settlers in Catalonia, as much as native-born Catalans (CIS 1994). These strong integrative goals have enabled successive CiU governments to quell any tendencies towards racism or xenophobia as evidenced in other regions of Spain (Conversi 1997; Delgado 1998 (Conversi 1997: 187) . As a consequence, the ability to speak Catalan is seen as a 'badge of achieved status' (Keating 1997 ) rather than a marker of ethnic exclusion. The policy is to assimilate immigrants into the Catalan community so that the nation remains culturally distinct from the rest of Spain. Although the CiU does not go as far as welcoming the creation of a multicultural society, it does articulate the benefits of integrating newcomers in Catalonia, which helps strengthen their identity and the (scale of) demands for autonomy, whilst enabling incomers to share the common culture of Catalonia.
Northern Italy
Italy experienced large-scale immigration for the first time in the 1980s, in response to economic More specifically, the Lega's immigration policy has been oriented towards the interests of the small business community in Northern Italy, which were 'threatened' by uncontrolled immigration (Allum and Diamanti 1996: 152) . Surveys have revealed that Southern Italians and immigrants are considered as outsiders in these communities (Piore and Sabel 1984: 229) 
Homogenous versus Cosmopolitan Nation-Building
From the previous discussion, it is clear that two contrasting regionalist party discourses have emerged regarding the composition of the nation in an integrating Europe: ethnic homogeneity versus multiculturalism and diversity, which has been described as 'cosmopolitanism' by some scholars (Guibernau 2006) . What are the motivations that underlie these positions? We can identify five factors that have influenced regionalist parties' immigration policies: (1) a concern with cultural reproduction linked to the economy and labour market; (2) the ideological profile of the parties; (3) regional party competition; (4) statewide influences including central government policy and positioning on immigration; and finally (5) playing the European ideological game.
Cultural Reproduction and the Labour Market
An important aspect of nation-building strategies is socioeconomic policy and cultural reproduction (Keating 1996; De Winter & Türsan 1998) . On the first matter regionalist parties have sought boost their economies to face the threats posed by depopulation, competition from foreign cultures and the opening of markets. Some regions are better positioned to face these challenges than others.
Bavaria, Catalonia and Northern Italy are three of the wealthiest regions in Europe, but their responses to securing economic prosperity have varied. Whilst the LN and CSU have accused immigrants of stealing local jobs and placing pressure on the welfare state, the CiU has sought to provide fairer social security and housing benefits for newcomers. The oft-cited charge that the working class must compete with immigrant groups for scarce resources has been treated differently by parties. The SNP argues that skilled immigrant workers are necessary for the well-functioning of the economy, whilst the LN has sought to evict immigrant competitor workers from Padania's borders. Regionalist parties also seek different solutions to demographic change. Whilst the CiU and SNP view immigration as necessary to sustain their economies and public services and have encouraged newcomers to settle their families in Scotland and Catalonia, the CSU has a highly selective immigration policy, whilst the Lega argues that Italy should encourage only the return of those of Italian descent.
Cultural issues are closely linked to economic resources. Regionalist parties often mobilise on the need to protect local cultures to secure their survival in the face of globalisation (Keating and McGarry 2001) . Parties such as the CSU and LN have demanded the creation of barriers to halt the inflow of immigrants into territorial communities, which are perceived as the source of 'dilution' of traditional cultures. This seems to corroborate Wagemann and Caramani's (2005) assertion that the tendency towards differentiation rather than assimilation of foreigners is indigenous to the Alpine region. But whilst these parties have sought to protect local cultures from newcomers, other regionalist parties have sought to normalise minority languages and cultures in order to assimilate immigrants into the nation. The CiU and SNP both advocate that immigration and multiculturalism can benefit the territorial project -through increasing the number of people claiming identification with the nation. For instance, the CiU has encouraged the use of Catalan in everyday life and business in order to ensure its continued survival, and it actively encourages immigrants to use Catalan as their first language (Conversi 1997) . Indeed, through its linguistic assimilation policies Catalonia has created policies a new generation of Catalan-speakers to struggle for recognition of their distinctiveness. Although, there are questions about the extent to which the CiU advocates the multicultural agenda, given that its policy of integration (assimilation) overrides any goal of celebrating cultural difference, on the part of immigrants, speaking Catalan is a way of sharing in the Catalan culture and identity, and acts as an incentive for immigrants to rise socially.
Party Ideology
According to some scholars, the immigration policies of political parties may be categorised by their ideological profile. For instance, Jupp (2003) are not easily mapped onto the left-right dimension (Hepburn 2009 ). In uniting the region under the banner of autonomy, regionalist parties must present themselves as a broad ideological church to attract the greatest support. Territorial mobilisation as a general phenomenon cannot be associated with a single ideology -a party's ideological profile depends on its historical development, leadership, response to party competition and opportunity structures, and its ability to accommodate different ideological strands. Ideological and socioeconomic concerns are often secondary, then, to the goal of self-determination, which itself is often a matter of debate within parties.
Local Party Competition
In constructing the territory, the competition that regionalist parties face in the local party system has an important shaping effect on their immigration policies. Most obviously, the immigration strategies of all parties, including regionalists, have been affected by the discourse of radical right anti-immigrant parties (Mudde 2007) . The CSU is a case in point. With the rise of the Republikaner in Bavaria during the late 1980s, the CSU vowed that no party should ever exist to its right (Mintzel 1999) . In other words, the CSU sought to include, rather than compete with, more extreme rightwing sentiment on issues such as immigration and European integration in order to maintain its monopoly over Bavarian politics. Yet there are other strategic reasons for pursuing a certain immigration policy, relating to the structure of the regional party system. In all of these cases, regionalist parties have used immigration as a tool with which to criticise the central government for failing to protect substate territorial interests. As well as opposing government immigration policies in defence of territorial interests, party strategies may also include seeking to influence and even implement statewide policies if the regionalist party is elected to office at the state level. The Northern League was able to draft and shape the 2002 Bossi-Fini law on immigration, and even called for the resignation of one of their ruling coalition's ministers, as he was perceived to be too moderate on immigration (Okoth 2003) . The statewide political arena therefore acts as an important influential and opportunity structure for the articulation of regionalist parties' immigration policies.
Playing the European ideological game
It has been argued that 'the European political arena has been open to regionalist movements that have emphasised territorial and inclusive nationalism and democracy, and not to those that cleave to ethnic exclusiveness or racism' (Keating 2006) . To that end, Europe has encouraged regionalist parties to adopt civic and inclusive criteria for territorial membership (Lynch 1996) . But whilst Europe may have been 'closed' to the ethnic-exclusive Lega Nord -which was expelled from the European Free Alliance -the CSU has avoided the need to 'de-ethnicise' its appeal as it categorises itself as a Christian conservative party. It has also been argued that regionalist parties are likely to advocate principles and themes common to those of the EU -such as support for free trade, diversity and a pro-integration outlook. Again, whilst the CiU and SNP seek to present themselves as avid Europeans (with the SNP advocating multiculturalism and the CiU welcoming the inclusion of immigrants), the Lega Nord -in rejecting diversity and the 'Europeanisation' of Padania, has been excluded from European networks. The CSU, which officially supporting the European principle of 'unity in diversity', rejects any moves towards multiculturalism.
This brings us to the question of how regionalist party support for European integration has related to their immigration goals. Some scholars have suggested that party positioning on, and public attitudes towards, these two issues is closely linked (Lahav 2004 
Conclusion: the Limits of Europeanisation
This article has sought to demonstrate how immigration has become an important mobilising issue for regionalist parties. Whilst the issue of immigration is ordinarily associated with radical right parties (Betz 1994; Jupp 2003; Lahav 2004; Zaslove 2006; Mudde 2007) , this research has shown that the regionalist party family has a different, but no less robust, stake in determining the barriers of citizenship and nationality. Immigration is intrinsically related to matters concerning the protection and advancement of regional identities and interests. However, as was shown, the manner in which regionalist parties mobilise on immigration, and link this to their territorial projects, varies significantly from country to country. Whilst some parties have welcomed immigration as a way of boosting their economies and expanding and diversifying national populations, other parties have rejected immigration as a threat to the labour market, and argue that it will undermine and fragment the national community. Rather than assume a homogenous response of regionalist parties to immigration, this discussion has sought to emphasise variation in parties' strategies to explain why some actors have become more Europeanised than others.
As we have seen, regionalist parties' immigration strategies have been largely informed by their constructions of the nation, which are often linked to their socioeconomic goals. The CiU and SNP both view immigration as necessary to support the economy, whilst the CSU and LN are more concerned with labour market protection, and shielding the nation from foreign influences, which they claim is being hastened by Europe's openness to immigration. Moreover, the SNP and CiU have pursued largely pro-European positions, advancing more progressive policy agendas based on inclusion, multiculturalism and diversity. The CSU does not feel obligated to legitimise its approach to immigration, as it stakes its position on the basis of Christian conservatism rather than nationalism. Meanwhile, the LN seems to have foregone any desire to satisfy European expectations, and has turned to criticising Europe from afar.
Whilst all of the parties under analysis have, at various times, supported Europe as an outlet for regionalist aspirations, the goal of a Europe of the Regions or Peoples has been interpreted differently: for some parties it has represented cultural and ethnic diversity in Europe, whilst for others it has meant keeping Europe out of the nation. The heterogeneity in attitudes to Europe, and to Europeanising the nation, indicates that we are far from realising the 'cosmopolitan nationalism'
that Guibernau (2006) argues for, which includes the 'right of any foreigner… to be treated without hostility in the country of arrival' which should go hand-in-hand with the eradication of 'the discrimination, repression and attempted annihilation suffered by some nations and ethnic groups'.
So far, this goal remains a dream. Whilst some parties like the CiU and SNP have embraced multiculturalism as part of their constructions of the nation, the CSU and Lega Nord continue to espouse ethnically exclusive visions of the territory, and in turn reject diversity, and
Europeanisation itself, as a threat to their traditional cultures. For these parties, an unresolved tension remains: having pursued autonomy strategies that argued for recognition of the diverse nations and peoples in Europe, not least their own, these parties unashamedly continue to oppose diversity within their own territorial borders.
